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SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROVING
PATENTABILITY VEL NON IN VIEW OF

DICKINSON V. ZURKO
Dawn-Marie Bey*
This Article addresses the Patent Office's misinterpretation of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Dickinson v. Zurko' regarding the applicability of the factual
review standards of the Administrative Procedure Act 2 (APA) to Patent Office
findings. In accordance with this misinterpretation, recent guidelines promulgated
by the Patent Office violate the APA and controlling precedent.
To date, the proper procedures for prosecuting a patent application have been
carefully honed through myriad statutes, rules, and controlling legal opinions.
The resulting procedures are set forth in exemplary prose in the Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (MPEP), which is issued and revised periodically by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office).3 Though the MPEP
is not citable as controlling authority, patent examiners and practitioners alike rely
heavily on the interpretations and examples set forth therein when partaking in

* Dawn-Marie Bey is an attorney with the law firm of Kilpatrick Stockton LLP. Ms. Bey was
a patent examiner with the United States Patent and Trademark Office for four years prior to joining
the firm. The opinions expressed herein are wholly owned by Ms. Bey and should in no way be
attributed to Kilpatrick Stockton LLP. The author wishes to acknowledge and thank Prof.
Christopher Cotropia of Tulane University School of Law for his advice and comments with respect
to the subject matter addressed herein.
1 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1930 (1999).
2 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2002).
3 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. PiFNT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATFNT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE (8th ed., rev. 1 2003), availabk at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
pac/mpep/indexold.htn [hereinafter MPEP or REVISED MPEP].
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the patent prosecution process. These interpretations and examples are revised
periodically to reflect changes in the controlling precedent.
In the February 2003 revision to the eighth edition of the MPEP, the authors
made a critical revision to section 2144.03.' This change, in essence, allows the
Patent Office to shift the burden of proof, in some cases, to the Applicant
without properly establishing a prima facie case of unpatentability with the
required objective evidence. Interestingly, included in the revised section is the
flawed explanation for the Patent Office's revised interpretation. The Patent
Office reasons that (1) the Supreme Court's decision in Dickinson v. Zurko, holding
that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit), must apply one
of the review standards set forth in the APA, and (2) the Federal Circuit's
adoption of the APA's "substantial evidence test" in accordance therewith,
reduces the evidentiary requirement for proving a prima facie case of
unpatentability.5 More particularly, the MPEP now states that in some cases, an
Examiner may shift to the Applicant the burden to prove patentability through
the administrative device of "official notice," without first establishing a prima
facie case of unpatentability with objective evidence.6 This interpretation clearly
flies in the face of current, long-standing, controlling Supreme Court precedent.
I. BACKGROUND
A. PATENT OFFICE POWERS AND PROCEEDINGS

Established in accordance with the Constitution, Congress codified the patent
laws via the 1952 Patent Act, thereby defining, inter alia, the types of subject
matter available for patent protection and the statutory requirements which must
be met in order to be granted patent protection.' The Patent Office was
established as an agency within the Department of Commerce; its responsibilities
and functions are to make and implement decisions and operations for granting
and issuing patents, and facilitating the registration of trademarks.8 Patent Office
proceedings are governed by the applicable statutes and rules established in
accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 2, which authorizes the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks, subject to the policy direction of the Secretary of Commerce, to

4 See id.
See MPEP, supra note 3, § 2144.03.
6 Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."); Act ofJuly 19, 1952, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. % 1-386 (2002)).
35 U.S.C. § 1 (2002).
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establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings
in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.9 As with other agencies established by
Congress, the Patent Office is also subject to the general administrative provisions
of the APA.' 0
The process for granting and issuing patents has evolved into an adversarial
examination process defined by the statutes and rules, interpreted by the case law
and explained through the MPEP. The parties to this process include the Patent
Office, e.g., a patent Examiner (Examiner) and the Applicant for the patent or,
most often, the Applicant's representative who is a member of the patent bar. In
cases where the requirements for patentability are met, the Examiner will indicate
allowance of the application for patent and the Patent Office will grant a patent
on the application. 1" However, as with any adversarial proceeding, in many cases
the Examiner refuses to allow the application for patent. The Applicant then has
numerous options, one of which is to appeal the decision of the Examiner. 12 This
initial appeal is heard by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI),
which is still within the purview of the agency. 3 All BPAI decisions are
subsequently subject to court review by either the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia or the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 4
B. PATENT OFFICE BEARS THE INITIAL BURDEN

The Examiner bears the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of
unpatentability. 15 When an Applicant files a patent application, including the
requisite claims, the claims are allowable unless the Examiner can establish a
prima facie case of unpatentability. 6 "Only if this burden is met does the burden
of coming forward with rebuttal argument or evidence shift to the applicant."' 7
Among other formal requirements for patentability, the claims of a patent

9 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2002).

'3

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2002).
35 U.S.C. § 131 (2002).
Id. § 134 (2002); MPEP, supra note 3, § 1205.
35 U.S.C. § 6 (2002); MPEP, supra note 3, § 1203.

4 35 U.S.C. §§ 141-145 (2002).

See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1557, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210, 1214 (Fed. Cit. 1995); In rm
Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443,1445,24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443,1444 (Fed. Cit. 1992) (holding that during
patent examination the PTO bears the initial burden of "presenting a prima fade case of
unpatentability"); In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472,223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 785,788 (Fed. Cit. 1984).
" In re Glaug, 283 F.3d 1335, 1338, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1152, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1151,
1152 (Fed. Cit. 2002) ("If the PTO fails to meet this burden, then the applicant is entitled to the
patent.").
," In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1557 (citing In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1955, 1956 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
15
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application must: (a) constitute patentable subject matter and thus have utility in
accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 101, (b) meet the disclosure requirements of 35
U.S.C. 5 112, (3) be novel in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 5 102 and (4) be nonobvious in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 103.18
It is with respect to the non-obvious determination where the concept of a
prima facie case of unpatentability is most readily exemplified. In Applicaion of
Warner,the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals placed the "burden of proof
on the Patent Office which requires it to produce the factual basis for its rejection
of an application under section 102 and 103."'' The basic factual inquiries that
the Patent Office must undertake in establishing the burden of proof with respect
to section 103 are as follows: 2 "the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be
ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved."'2 The
Supreme Court requires the Patent Office to perform this analysis for each patent
application, stating: "[w]e believe that strict observance of the requirements laid
down here will result in that uniformity and definiteness which Congress called
for in the 1952 Act.' 22 When the references cited by the examiner fail to establish
a prima facie case of obviousness, the rejection is improper and will be overturned. 23 The MPEP dedicates a considerable number of pages to addressing
these basic factual inquiries and summarizing the procedures that are to be applied
and followed by the Patent Office in order to establish a prima face case of
unpatentability. Section 2142 of the MPEP, entitled "Legal Concept of Prima
FadeObviousness," provides guidance to Examiners for establishing a prima facie
case of obviousness pursuant to the controlling case law. Section 2142 states
clearly:
The legal concept of primafacie obviousness is a procedural tool of
examination which applies broadly to all arts. It allocates who has
the burden of going forward with production of evidence in each
step of the examination process. The examiner bears the initial
burden of factually supporting any prima fade conclusion of
obviousness. If the examiner does not produce aprimafade case,
the applicant is under no obligation to submit evidence of
nonobviousness. If, however, the examiner does produce a prima

35 U.S.C. % 101-103, 112 (2002); see also MPEP, supra note 3, § 2100.
In reWamer, 379 F.2d 1011, 1016, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 173, 177 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
20 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2002).
21 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 467 (1966).
18
19

22

Id.at 18.

23In

re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1074, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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fade case, the burden of coming forward with evidence or arguments shifts to the applicant who may submit additional evidence
of nonobviousness, such as comparative test data showing that the
claimed invention possesses improved properties not expected by
the prior art.24
Consequently, there must be prior art that suggests the claimed invention in order
for a prima facie case of obviousness to be established. In the absence of such
a showing, and assuming all other requirements for patentability have been met,
25
the claims are allowable.
C. SUPPORTING A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF UNPATENTABILITY

"The patent examination process centers on prior art and the analysis
thereof. '26 The "prior art" must be in the form of a reference (a document) or
some other tangibly embodied description. Further, a document relied upon as
a printed publication must have traversed into the public domain, meaning it must
have been accessible to the public. 2' The burden of establishing that a document
was publicly accessible rests upon the Examiner as part of his burden of
establishing a prima facie basis for denying patentability. 29 Prior art might also be
in the form of an affidavit, signed by the Examiner, setting forth specific factual

2'MPEP, supra note 3, § 2142 (citations omitted). Moreover, In reRinehart, 531 F.2d 1048,
1051, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 143, 147 (C.C.P.A. 1976) state's:
A prima facie case of obviousness is established when the teachings from the
prior art itself would appear to have suggested the claimed subject matter to a
person of ordinary skill in the art. Once such a case is established, it is
incumbent upon appellant to go forward with objective evidence of
unobviousness.
In reLinter, 458 F.2d 1013, 1016, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560, 562 (C.C.P.A. 1972) also held:
In determining the propriety of the Patent Office case for obviousness in the
first instance, it is necessary to ascertain whether or not the reference teachings
would appear to be sufficient for one of ordinary skill in the relevant art having
the references before him to make the proposed substitution, combination or
other modification.
Inventions must meet the requirements of utility, novelty, and non-obviousness and, further,
must be described so as to meet written description, enablement and best mode requirements for
patentability. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2002); MPEP, spra note 3, § 2100.
26 In reSang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1342-43, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430,1433 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
' See MPEP, supra note 3, § 901.
21 In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 1361-62, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 670, 675 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
-' Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1568-69, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1057, 1062-63 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In reWyer, 655 F.2d 221, 225-26, 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 790,793-94
(C.C.P.A. 1981).
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statements and explanations to support the Examiner's reliance on personal
knowledge to support a finding of what is known in the art) °
As stated previously, "the examiner bears the initial burden of factually
supporting any primafade conclusion of obviousness."' 3 There are three basic
criteria for establishing a prima facie case of obviousness as set forth in the
section 2143 of the MPEP:
First, there must be some suggestion or motivation, either in the
references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one
of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine
reference teachings. Second, there must be a reasonable expectawhen
tion of success. Finally, the prior art reference (or references
32
combined) must teach or suggest all the claim limitations.
Though these criteria are presented in the MPEP in the order set forth above, the
final criterion is the threshold criterion. The teachings must teach or suggest the
claim limitations, before those references can be combined to reject the claim. In
order to establish a prima facie case of obviousness, each of these criteria must
be met. Of particular importance to this Article is this threshold requirement that
all claim limitations must be taught or suggested by the prior art.33
The criterion requiring that all claim limitations be taught by the prior art,
when read in view of 35 U.S.C. 5 103, implies that one or more references are
necessary to cover the claimed limitations.3" By way of example, referring to
Table 1, given claim I containing limitations A, B, C and D, in order to establish
a prima facie case of obviousness, each of limitations A, B, C and D must be
taught or suggested by the prior art. So for example, assuming the remaining two
criteria for establishing a prima face case are met (i.e., motivation and reasonable
expectation of success) if reference X teaches or suggests limitations A and B,
reference Y teaches or suggests at least limitation C, and reference Z teaches or
suggests limitation D, the Patent Office has established a prima facie case of
obviousness. To the contrary, a prima facie case of obviousness cannot be
established in this situation with fewer than all three references, as the Patent

See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(d)(2) (2002).
3'MPEP, supra note 3, § 2142.

3 Id.
§ 2143.
" See In re Royka, 490 F.2d 981,180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 580 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
As an aside, one should be reminded that if all of the claim limitations were taught or
suggested by a single piece of prior art, the claim would be anticipated under the appropriate part
of 35 U.S.C. § 102. See MPEP, supra note 3, § 2131 (citing Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of
Calif., 814 F.2d 628, 631, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
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Office would fail to meet at least the required criterion that all claims limitations
are taught or suggested by the prior art.
TABIIFA:PRMFA
Claim 1
Limitation A
Limitation B
Limitation C
Limitation D

Reference X

1 CSESAIS-ID
Reference Y

Reference Z

/

/
/
/

But continuing with the example above, there are special cases wherein one of
the limitations (D, for example) is asserted by the Patent Office to be so
notoriously well known that it would be a waste of all parties' resources to require
the Patent Office to search for a reference that teaches limitation D prior to
completing and sending an Office Action containing a rejection of claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103. Referring to Table 2, in such an Office Action the Patent Office
would reject claim 1 as being obvious over reference X in view of reference Y and
take official notice that limitation D is notoriously well known. First, this type of
rejection should be used sparingly and in rare circumstances.15 Second, in this
example the Patent Office has not established a prima facie case of obviousness
such that the burden to present evidence of non-obviousness necessarily shifts to
the Applicant.
Unlike factual arguments for unpatentability made by the Patent Office based
on references or even case law, when an Examiner takes official notice it does not
meet the necessary factual basis for supporting a prima facie case of
unpatentability.36 Instead, in the interest of efficiency and resource preservation,
the Patent Office has presented the Applicant with what it believes to be a
reasonable rejection of claim 1. At this point in the prosecution, the rejection
cannot rise to the level of a prima facie showing of obviousness because the
Patent Office has failed to meet at least the requirement that all limitations of
claim 1 are taught or suggested by the prior art. The prior art, more particularly
references, constitute the evidence required to support a proffered prima facie
case of obviousness. This evidentiary requirement has been reiterated time and
again by the Federal Circuit, which recently held in In re Sang-Su Lee.

3 See MPEP, supra note 3, 5 2144.
36 See supra Part l.A.
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As applied to the determination of patentability ve! non when the
issue is obviousness, "it is fundamental that rejections under 35
U.S.C. § 103 must be based on evidence comprehended by the
language of that section." The essential factual evidence on the
issue of obviousness is set forth in Grahamv. JohnDeere Company and
extensive ensuing precedent."
Accordingly, an Office Action setting forth an obviousness rejection based on
Table 2 does not, without more, establish a prima facie case of obviousness.
TABLE 2: PRIMA FACIE CASE NOT ESTABLISHED
Claim 1
Limitation A
Limitation B
Limitation C
Limitation D

Reference X
V.,
V/

Reference Y

Official Notice

_

Of/

Further, even if the threshold requirement that each limitation of a claim be
taught or suggested is met, there must additionally be some suggestion or
motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally
available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine
reference teachings in order to establish a prima facie case of unpatentability."
The Federal Circuit recently addressed this requirement specifically in In reSang-Su
Lee, finding that " '[t]he factual inquiry whether to combine references must be
thorough and searching.' It must be based on objective evidence of record. This
precedent has been reinforced in myriad decisions, and cannot be dispensed
with."39 In this case, the Examiner found and cited references showing each of

37 In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d at 1342 (citations omitted).
38 MPEP, supra note 3,

§ 2143.

In re Sang-SuLee, 277 F.3d at 1343 (quoting McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339,
1351-52,60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[TMhe central question is whether there
is reason to combine [thej references, a question of fact drawing on the Graham factors.")); see also
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1124-25, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1456, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("[A] showing of a suggestion, teaching, or motivation to
combine the prior art references is an essential component of an obviousness holding."); In re
Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Our case law
makes clear that the best defense against the subtle but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based
obviousness analysis is rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of the teaching or
motivation to combine prior art references."); In re Dance, 160 F.3d 1339, 1343, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1635, 1637 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[lihere must be some teaching, suggestion or motivation in
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the claimed limitations but offered no evidence in support of the conclusory
statements made regarding the motivation to combine the references. 40 Citing
earlier authority, the Federal Circuit held that particular findings must be made on
the record as to why one skilled in the art would have been motivated to combine
the references. 4' Further,
The patent examiner and the Board are deemed to have experience
in the field of the invention; however, this experience, insofar as
applied to the determination of patentability, must be applied from
the viewpoint of "the person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains," the words of section 103. In
finding the relevant facts, in assessing the significance of the prior
art, and in making the ultimate determination of the issue of
obviousness, the examiner and the Board are presumed to act from
this viewpoint. Thus when they rely on what they assert to be
general knowledge to negate patentability, that knowledge must be
articulated and placed on the record. The failure to do so is not
consistent with either effective administrative procedure or effective

the prior art to make the specific combination that was made by the applicant."); In reFine, 837 F.2d
1071, 1075, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1600 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[Tleachings of references can be
combined ony if there is some suggestion or incentive to do so.") (citations omitted),
at 1343-44. The court stated:
4 Id.
The examiner's conclusory statements that "the demonstration mode is just a
programmable feature which can be used in many different device[s] for
providing automatic introduction by adding the proper programming software"
and that "another motivation would be that the automatic demonstration mode
is user friendly and it functions as a tutorial" do not adequately address the issue
of motivation to combine. This factual question of motivation is material to
patentability, and could not be resolved on subjective belief and unknown
authority.
'

Id.at 1343 (citing In reKotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1371, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313, 1317 (Fed.

Cir. 2000) ("[P]articular findings must be made as to the reason the skilled artisan, with no
knowledge of the claimed invention, would have selected these components for combination in the

manner claimed."); In reRouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1359,47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453, 1459 (Fed. Cir.
1998)
[E]ven when the level of skill in the art is high, the Board must identify
specifically the principle, known to one of ordinary skill, that suggests the
claimed combination. In other words, the Board must explain the reasons one
of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to select the references
and to combine them to render the claimed invention obvious.
In reFritch, 972 F.2d 1260,1265,23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1780,1783 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that the
burden of showing obviousness can be satisfied "only by showing some objective teaching in the
prior art or that knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art would lead that
individual to combine the relevant teachings of the references")).
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judicial review. The board cannot rely on conclusory statements
when dealing with particular combinations of prior art and specific
claims, but must set forth the rationale on which it relies.4 Accordingly, in order to establish a prima facie case of unpatentability, the
Examiner must provide, inter alia, a prior art reference or references teaching or
suggesting each of the claimed limitations and objective evidence supporting a
motivation to combine the cited prior art references.
D. THE PATENT OFFICE'S EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENT

1. The Standardof Review for Patent Office Decisions. Until 1999, administrative
decisions by the Patent Office were not subject to any of the standards explicitly
defined in the APA when being reviewed by the courts. Per the en banc holding
of the Federal Circuit, the standard of review for factual findings made by the
Patent Office up to 1999 was the clearly erroneous standard.43 In the Supreme
Court's decision in Dickinson v. Zurko, the highest Court reversed the Federal
Circuit and held that the Federal Circuit must apply one of the standards defined
by the APA." Following the holding of the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit
selected the substantial evidence standard from the APA's sanctioned review
standards, stating that, "[b]ecause our review of the Board's decision is confined
to the factual record compiled by the Board, we accordingly conclude that the
'substantial evidence' standard is appropriate for our review of Board
factfindings."
In support of this standard, the Federal Circuit reasoned that review of PTO
Board proceedings falls within section 706(2) (E) of the APA, particularly, that the
Board proceedings are "otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing
provided by statute., 4 6 The court found that:

42 Id. at 1345.

" In r Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1691, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev'd
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1930, 1932 (1999).
" Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 152; see also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2002)
(containing directions and standards of review for courts reviewing agency actions).
" In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305,1315, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1775 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also
Thomas Leonard Stoll, A Ckar#ErroneousStandardof Review, 79 J. PAT. & TRADF.MARK 01F. Soc'Y
100, 106 (1997) (arguing in favor of "substantial evidence" review based on 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) and
144).
46 In re Gartide, 203 F.3d at 1313 (citing Administration Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)
(1994 (current version 2002)).
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[s]ection 706(2)(E) provides that "substantial evidence" review is
afforded to agency factfmding performed during an adjudication in
two circumstances: (1) factfinding performed in "a case subject to
sections 556 and 557 of this tile," and (2) factfmding performed in
a case "reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by
47
statute.

'

Importantly, the court held that "[f]actfmding by the Board does not fall within
the first category, as § 554 excludes PTO adjudication from the trial-type
procedures set forth in 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 and 557.,,48 The court made a distinction
between section 554 "adjudications" to which the "trial-type procedures" of 5
U.S.C. § 556 and 557 are applicable and cases such as PTO Board adjudications,
finding:
Specifically, section § [sic] 554(a)(1) excludes agency adjudication
from these requirements when the subject matter of that adjudication is subject to a subsequent trial de novo, as in the case of Board
adjudication. Accordingly, these interrelated statutes dictate that
Board factfinding does not fall within the first category of
49
706(2)(E).
Instead, the Federal Circuit found support for the hearing from which the
Board's record is built from outside of the APA, citing 35 U.S.C. 5 144, which
states:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall
review the decision from which an appeal is taken on the record
before the Patent and Trademark Office. Upon its determination
the court shall issue to the Director its mandate and opinion, which
shall be entered of record in the Patent and Trademark Office and
shall govern the further proceedings in the case.5"

47

Id.

Id; see also 5 U.S.C. §544(a)(1) (2002) (excluding matters "subject to a subsequent trial of the
law and the facts de nova in a court").
41In re Gartside,203 F.3d at 1313 (citations omitted).
50 35 U.S.C. § 144 (1994).
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§ 7(b), which states:

The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences shall, on written
appeal of an applicant, review adverse decisions of examiners upon
applications for patents and shall determine priority and
patentability of invention in interferences declared under section
135(a) of this title. Each appeal and interference shall be heard by
at least three members of the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences, who shall be designated by the Commissioner. Only
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences has the authority to
grant rehearings."s
The Federal Circuit reasoned that the alternative and highly deferential "arbitrary,
capricious" standard was not applicable because this standard only applies when
the "substantial evidence" standard is deemed inapplicable. 2
Though both parties presented many arguments in Dickinson v. Zurko stressing
the deferential differences between the "clearly erroneous" court/court review
standard and the "substantial evidence" court/agency standard (the latter being
arguably more deferential than the former), the Supreme Court's decision clearly
downplayed any deferential difference. The Court reasoned:
The court/agency standard, as we have said, is somewhat less strict
than the court/court standard. But the difference is a subtle one-sofine
that (apartfiom thepresent case) we havefailed to uncover a single instance in
ratherthan the other
which a reviewing court conceded thatuse of one 5standard
3
would in fact have produceda different outcome.
And in response to the Federal Circuit's concerns with the application of a more
deferential standard of factual review, the Court stated: "we believe the [Federal]
Circuit overstates the difference that a change of standard will mean in practice."54
The Supreme Court went on to state:
These features of review underline the importance of the fact that,
when a Federal Circuit judge reviews PTO factfmding, he or she
often will examine that finding through the lens of patent-related
experience-and properly so, for the Federal Circuit is a specialized

51
52

35 U.S.C. § 7(b) (1994).
In irGartside,203 F.3d at 1313.

" Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 163 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
14 Id at 162.
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court. That comparative expertise, by enabling the Circuit better to
understand the basis for the PTO's finding of fact, may play a more
important role in assuring proper review than would a theorelicaly
somewhat stricterstandard. Moreover, ifthe Circuit means to suggest that a
change ofstandardcould somehow immuniZe the PTO'sfact-related "reasoning"
from review, we disagree. A reviewing court reviews an agency's
reasoning to determine whether it is "arbitrary" or "capricious," or,
if bound up with a record-based factual conclusion, to determine
whether it is supported by "substantial evidence."5
Clearly, in its effort to facilitate the proper application of the agency/court
APA standards to the Patent Office (as opposed to the judicial court/court
standards), the Supreme Court envisioned that the change in applicable standard
is in essence a change in form, not substance. The Court stressed that the
"substantial evidence test," or indeed any test applicable under the APA, should
not result in simply "rubber-stamping agency factfinding."56 Like court/court fact
finding review, "the APA requires meaningful review; and its enactment meant
stricter judicial review of agency factfmding than Congress believed some courts
had previously conducted.""7 Commensurate with this idea of form over
substance, the Federal Circuit found in a post-Dickinson case that, "Deferential
judicial review under the [APA] does not relieve the agency of its obligation to
develop an evidentiary basis for its findings. To the contrary, the [APA]
' 's
reinforces this obligation.

53 Id at 163-64 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
16 Id at 162 (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951)). In Universal
Camera,the Court stated:
Reviewing courts must be influenced by a feeling that they are not to abdicate
the conventional judicial function. Congress has imposed on them responsibility
for assuring that the Board keeps within reasonable grounds. That responsibility
is not less real because it is limited to enforcing the requirement that evidence
appear substantial when viewed, on the record as a whole, by courts invested
with the authority and enjoying the prestige of the Courts of Appeals. The
Board's findings are entitled to respect; but they must nonetheless be set aside
when the record before a Court ofAppeals clearly precludes the Board's decision
from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses
or its informed judgment on matters within its special competence or both.
57 Id
58 In re
Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983) ("[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for

its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.") (citations
omitted); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) ("The orderly function of the process of
review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted are clearly disclosed
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2. "OfficialNotice" Under the Administrative ProceduresAct. The phrase "official
notice" is a term of art in the administrative and evidentiary areas of the law.
Broadly, "official notice" is the administrative law device for entering into the
record information which has not been proved through the hearing methods. 9
The referenced information consists of facts, both adjudicative and legislative. °
The applicable section of the APA with respect to "official notice" is section 556
which states in relevant part:
(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof to hearings
required by section 553 or 554 of this tide to be conducted in accordance with this section.

(e) The transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all papers
and requests filed in the proceeding, constitutes the exclusive record
for decision in accordance with section 557 of this tide and, on
payment of lawfully prescribed costs, shall be made available to the
parties. When an agency decision rests on official notice of a
material fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is
entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity to show the contrary.61
As emphasized, section 556 is applicable to hearings required by sections 553,
"Rule Making," and section 554.62 And as described above, the Federal Circuit
has determined that Patent Office adjudications are not "adjudications" within the
meaning of section 554.63 Thus, it would seem that any "official notice"
requirements stemming from section 556 may not necessarily be applicable to
Patient Office adjudications. Setting this question aside, section 556 does little to

and adequately sustained.")).
'9 CHARLES H. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PRACTICE § 5.55 (2d ed. 1997).
6) Kenneth Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 364, 402 (1942). Mr. Davis states:
When a court or an agency finds facts concerning the immediate parties-who
did what, where, when, how, and with what motive or intent-[it] is performing
an adjudicative function, and the facts are conveniently called adjudicative facts.
When a court or an agency develops law or policy, it is acting legislatively; the
courts have created the common law through judicial legislation, and the facts
which inform the tribunals' legislative judgment are called legislative facts ....
Legislative facts are ordinarily general and do not concern the immediate parties.
61 5 U.S.C.
62 I d

S 556 (emphasis added).

63 See supra Part I D.
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define with any particularity the metes and bounds of "official notice." Instead,
section 556 focuses on the right of rebuttal when "official notice" has been relied
upon in an agency decision.' Consequently, courts have undertaken to define
when agencies may take official notice, and more particularly, what facts and
factual contexts are conducive to takings of official notice.
Clearly, an administrative agency's discretion to take official notice "depends
on the particular case before it."6 5 A basic prerequisite for the use of official
66
evidence is that the information noticed must be appropriate for official notice.
In the Supreme Court's pre-APA, 1937 Ohio Bellcase, the agency party de-valued
a utility company's property for ratemaking purposes to reflect the Great
Depression.6 7 While the Court found no difficulty with the agency's taking notice
of the depression as such, or of the general decline in market values as "one of its
concomitants," it objected to the agency's use of the data, for the general decline
did not show "[h]ow great the decline has been for this industry or that, for one
material or another, in this year or the next."" More importantly, the Court
found that the agency perpetrated a greater wrong by never disclosing the
particular evidence on which it relied:
There has been more than an expansion of the concept of notoriety
beyond reasonable limits. From the standpoint of due process--the
protection of the individual against arbitrary action-a deeper vice
is this, that even now we do not know the particular or evidential
facts of which the Commission took judicial notice and on which
it rested its conclusion. Not onjy are thefacts unknown; there isno way
tofind them out. When price lists or trade journals or even government reports are put in evidence upon a trial, the party against
whom they are offered may see the evidence or hear it and parry its
effect.69
64See 5 U.S.C. § 556.
65

Kowalczyk v. INS, 245 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing de laLlana-Castellon v. INS,

16 F.3d 1093, 1097 (10th Cir. 1994); Castillo-Villagra v. INS, 972 F.2d 1017, 1027 (9th Cit. 1992)
("[T]he administrative desirability of notice as a substitute for evidence cannot be allowed to
outweigh fairness to individual litigants.")).
66

id

Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Ohio, 301 U.S. 292 (1937).
Id.at 301.
69 Id at 302 (emphasis added). The Court went on to state, id at 300 (emphasis added), that:
67
61

The fundamentals of a trial were denied to the appellant when rates previously
collected were ordered to be refunded upon the strength of evidential facts not
spread upon the record.
The Commission had given notice that the value of the property would be
fixed as of a date certain. Evidence directed to the value at that time had been
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Thus, the party against which the officially noticed facts were used had no
opportunity to "see the evidence or hear it and parry its effect."7" Elaborating, the
Supreme Court noted the broad discretion given to administrative agencies in
conducting quasi-judicial proceedings and stressed
the paramount importance of
71
ensuring the integrity of such proceedings.
Similarly, in 1989, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, citing
Ohio Bell, found that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") had
violated section 556 of the APA when the FERC used treasury interest rates for
inferences on the cost of equity, without providing evidence to support such
inferences.72 Apparently reading these requirements into the APA, the court
interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in Ohio Bell "as establishing two
prerequisites for use of official evidence. First, the information noticed must be
appropriate for official notice. Second, the agency must follow proper procedures
in using the information, disclosing it to the parties and affording them a suitable
opportunity to contradict it or 'parry its effect.' ,71 Consequently, though it was
perfectly acceptable for the FERC to take notice of the interest rates on treasury
bonds for ratemaking purposes since "such information is not typically subject
to dispute," under the APA, the FERC must provide rebuttable evidence for the

laid before the triers of the facts in thousands of printed pages. To make the
picture more complete, evidence had been given as to the value at cost of
additions and retirements. Without warning or even the hint of warning that the
case would be considered or determined upon any other basis than the evidence
submitted, the Commission cut down the valuesfor theyears a er the date certain npon the
strength of information secret collected and neveryet disclosed
Ild at 302.
71 Ic! at 304. Further, the Court provided, id at 304 (citations omitted), that:
Regulatory commissions have been invested with broad powers within the sphere
of duty assigned to them by law. Even in quasi-judicial proceedings their
informed and expert judgment exacts and receives a proper deference from
courts when it has been reached with due submission to constitutional restraints.
Indeed, much that they do within the realm of administrative discretion is
exempt from supervision if those restraints have been obeyed. All the more
insistent is the need, when power has been bestowed so freely, that the 'inexorable safeguard' of a fair and open hearing be maintained in its integrity.
72 Union Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 890 F.2d 1193, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1989) found
that:
The Commission's procedures in using the Treasury interest rates for inferences
on the cost of equity, however, did not adequately protect Union's right to "parry
[their] effect," i.e., to challenge the Commission's inference. In Ohio Bell, the
Court had no difficulty with the Ohio commission's taking notice of the Great
Depression, but invalidated its use of that fact (plus undisclosed additional
material) for inferences about the value of Ohio Bell's assets.
3 Id. at 1202.
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inferences drawn therefrom in order to afford the opposite party'74their "right to
'parry [their] effect' by challenging the Commission's inference.
More recently still, in Dayco Corporationv. FTC, the Sixth Circuit aptly noted
that a party need not invoke the APA's right to rebuttal of an officially noticed
fact until official notice has been properly employed." In Dayco, the FTC took
official notice of numerous facts and presumptions in support if its prima facie
case that Dayco was in violation of section 2(a) of the Clayton Act.76 The court
determined that the officially noticed facts were critical to the FTC's finding that
Dayco was in violation of the statute and that the facts were adjudicative facts
because "they relate[d] to, and were determinative of, one individual situation or
course of conduct."77 The burden of proof in Dayco rested squarely with the
FTC.78 And although the court recognized that "properly employed official
notice may assist an agency in meeting its burden,"79 the court employed the
following rationale of a well-known treatise to support its reasoning that the
FTC's burden was not met in this case:
It needs no argument to demonstrate that agendes may not take notice of the
'litigationfacts' involved in a particularcase; to do so would be to shift the
burden ofproofand make a mockegy of the heaingprocedure. The doctrine
of notice should be limited to facts of a general nature, representing
generalizations distilled from repeated demonstrations. 0
The court held:
To us theproceduralimpropiety ofthe Commission's use ofoffidal notice as a
substitutefor pmof isplain. It requires vacation of the order finding
Dayco guilty of violation of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act, vacation of its cease and desist order entered pursuant thereto.
It is so ordered.81

SId. at 1203 (citing Ms. Indus. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1525, 1568 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)).
" Dayco Corp. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 180, 185 (6th Cir. 1966).

76 Id

at 184.

77 Id at 186.

"' Id (citing 16 C.F.R. § 3.14 (1966)).
79 Id
80 Id (citing FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 413 (vol. 1 1965)) (emphasis

added).
" Id at 187 (emphasis added).
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A fair interpretation of the combined holdings of Ohio Bell, Union Electricand
Dayco is that under the APA, (1) official notice is not appropriate in all circumstances, (2) an agency's findings with respect to adjudicative facts (facts
determinative of an individual situation) must be supported by rebuttable
evidence in order to establish a prima facie case in support of an agency finding
and shift the burden of proving otherwise to the opposing party, and (3) the party
against whom such facts are officially noticed with the requisite rebuttable
evidence must be afforded a suitable opportunity to contradict such facts.82 As
the case law supports no exception, this interpretation appears to apply to all
agency proceedings, including quasi-judicial proceedings, irrespective of the
explicit applicability of section 556.83
This Article addresses how the Patent Office rejections that rely at least in part
on official notice have been addressed by the Patent Office and the courts,
including a comparison and analysis between long-standing practice and recent
changes to the MPEP in light of Dickinson v. Zurko. Recent changes to the MPEP
appear to facilitate the inequitable shifting of the Patent Office's burden to prove
obviousness in violation of the APA, thus requiring the Applicant to rebut
rejections without the requisite evidence.
II. ESTABLISHING A PRIMA FACIE CASE WITH "OFFICIAL NOTICE"
A. PRE-DICKINSON V. ZURKO

There is no question that even prior to the Supreme Court's holding in
Dickinson v. Zurko, the Patent Office was clearly recognized as an "agency" as
defined in the APA and thus generally subject to the provisions thereof'M The
sole, albeit important decision made in Dickinson was the conformance of the
judicial standard of factual review to one of those enumerated in the APA. 5 As
discussed in detail above, this decision was ultimately one of form, in that it
focused on theory over substance. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Dickinson, the MPEP did provide for the taking of official notice of facts outside
of the record by an Examiner to support a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103.6

82 Ohio BellTe Co., 301 U.S. 292; Union Elec. Co., 890 F.2d 1193; Dqyco Corp., 362 F.2d 180.
s See supra note 71.

Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150,154,50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1930,1932 (1999) ("The parties
agree that the PTO is an 'agency' subject to the APA's constraints, that the PTO's finding at issue
in this case is one of fact, and that the finding constitutes 'agency action.' ").
85 Id
81 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT

EXAMINING PROCEDURE (8th ed. 2001), § 2144, availabk at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
pac/mpep/indexold.htm [hereinafter UNREVISED MPEP].
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More particularly, section 2144 of the unrevised 8th edition of the MPEP, dated
August 2001 (Unrevised MPEP), stated that "[t]he examiner may take official
notice of facts outside of the record which are capable of instant and unquestionable demonstration as being 'well-known' in the art."" The Unrevised MPEP
reasoned that, "[i] f justified, the examiner should not be obliged to spend time to
produce documentary proof. If the knowledge is of such notorious character that
official notice can be taken, it is sufficient so to state.""8 But this action by the
Examiner was tempered by the requirement that if the Applicant seasonably
traversed the taking of official notice, then the Examiner was required to cite a
reference in support of the noticed fact. 9
This reasoning and course of action was commensurate with the requirements
of the APA for taking, supporting, and rebutting official notice. According to the
Unrevised MPEP, all officially noticed facts were subject to a seasonable challenge
by the Applicant.9" If the Applicant does not seasonably challenge the official
notice, or does challenge the notice and is provided with objective evidence in
support thereof, then the Examiner has established a prima facie case and has
succeeded in shifting the full burden of rebutting an obviousness determination
to the Applicant.9 The Applicant's burden of challenging official notice required
no evidence or argument, it merely required a seasonable demand for objective
evidence from the Examiner.9 2 Further, if the noticed fact was seasonably
challenged by the Applicant and the Examiner failed to provide the requisite
evidence while maintaining the rejection, the Examiner's failure to provide
evidence constituted clear and reversible error.93

" Id (citing In re Ahlert, 424 F.2d 1088, 1091, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 418, 420 (C.C.P.A. 1970)
(concerning proper judicial notice that "it is common practice to postheat a weld after the welding
operation is completed" and "it is old to adjust the intensity of a flame in accordance with the heat
requirements")); see also Inre Eynde, 480 F.2d 1364, 1370, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 470,474 (C.C.P.A.
1973) ("The facts constituting the state of the art are normally subject to the possibility of rational
disagreement among reasonable men and are not amenable to the taking of [judicial] notice."); In re

Seifreid, 407 F.2d 897, 900, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 804, 806 (C.C.P.A. 1969) ("Tlhe reference of
record support examiner's statement that polyetheylene terephthalate films are commonly known
to be shrinkable.").
18 UNREVISED MPEP, supra note 87, § 2144 (citing In re Malcolm, 129 F.2d 529, 54 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 235 (C.C.P.A. 1942)).
89 Id
90 Id

91 2 FED. PROC., L. ED. § 2:201 (2004) ("Furthermore, an opportunity to rebut may be waived,
and the facts officially noticed may be deemed to be true, if a party does not timely object to the use
of officially noticed facts.").
92 In re Chevenard, 139 F.2d 711,713, 60 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 239, 240 (C.C.P.A. 1943).
"3ExparteNouel,158 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 237, 239 (P.T.O. Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1967).
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In ExparteNatale,the Examiner rejected certain claims as being unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103, and in lieu of citing prior art that taught or suggested each
of the claimed limitations, "the examiner [took] notice of the fact that ventilation
flaps in a tent system are normally understood to be capable of sealing the
openings they control when they are closed."94
Furthermore, although this noticed fact was challenged by the appellant
"[n]otwithstanding appellant's challenge for evidentiary support, the examiner
maintained his position.""5 The Board found that "the examiner's failure to
provide objective evidence to support the challenged officially-noticed fact
constituted clear and reversible error."96 Similarly, in In re Sang-Su Lee, the Federal
Circuit found that the "common knowledge and common sense" on which the
Examiner and ultimately the Board relied in rejecting the appellant's claims
amounted to conclusory statements which could not substitute for the required
authority (factual findings).97 Importantly, the court held that "[t]he Board's
findings must extend to all material facts and must be documented in the record,
lest the 'haze of so-called expertise' acquire insulation from accountability."9
The procedures set forth in the Unrevised MPEP correctly identified that
substantive facts (adjudicative facts) were not the proper subject matter for taking
official notice such that an Examiner established a prima facie case of
unpatentability.99 This is clear from the fact that an Applicant needed only
seasonably challenge the taking, or simply request the requisite evidence."' If it
were enough to establish a prima facie case of unpatentability by merely taking
official notice of substantive facts, i.e., the presence of a claim limitation or
motivation to combine in the prior art, then a mere challenge without more would
not have been sufficient to shift the burden back to the Examiner. As such, this
procedural sequence can only be interpreted as stating that the elements of a
prima facie case can only be established with official notice if the Applicant does
not seasonably challenge the taking. But the Unrevised MPEP didrecognize and
encourage Examiners to take official notice of facts that in the Examiner's view
clearly should not be subject to controversy and, assuming no seasonable

9'Exparte Natale, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1222, 1226 (P.T.O. Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1989).
95 Id

96Id (citing Exparte Nouel,158 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 239).
9'In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344-45, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1434-35 (citing
Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 533 U.S. 359, 376 (1998) ("Because reasoned
decisionmaking demands it, and because the systemic consequences of any other approach are
unacceptable, the Board must be required to apply in fact the clearly understood legal standards that
it enunciates in principle.")).
98 Id

99UNREVISED MPEP, spra note 87, § 2144.
tooId
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challenge by the Applicant, would be taken as evidenced.1"' Consequently, the
Unrevised MPEP put procedures in place whereby the truly non-substantive facts
(notoriously well known claim limitations or motivations) need not be proved
with a reference, thus facilitating narrower issues and expeditious prosecution.
This procedure benefited both the Examiner, the Applicant, and the public,
1 2
assuming agreement of the notoriety of the noticed facts.
B.

AFTER DICKINSON V. ZURKO

In view of Dickinson v. Zurko, and more particularly In re Gartside,the Patent
Office has revised section 2144 of the eighth edition of the MPEP (Revised
MPEP). 1 3 Citing the new factual evidentiary review standard (substantial
evidence) as the impetus for the revisions, the Patent Office now supports taking
official notice without the further requirement that objective evidence be
provided when challenged.
Specifically, the Revised MPEP states:
In light of recent Federal Circuit decisions as discussed below and
the substantial evidence standard of review now applied to USPTO
Board decisions, the following guidance is provided in order to assist the
examiners in determiningwhen it is appropriateto take official notice offacts
without supporting documentary evidence or to rely on common knowledge in the art in making a rejection, and if such official notice is

101 Id.

102 Lance Leonard Barry, Did You EverNotice? OffitialNotice in Reecion, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK

OFF. SOC'Y 129, 130 (1999). Mr. Barry states:
Administrative efficiency is one rationale for official notice. Like its courtroom
counterpart judicial notice, official notice derives from the legal maxim manifesta
[or notoia] non indigent probatione, i.e., "what is known need not be proved."
The maxim may be traced so far back in civil and canon law that it is probably
coeval with legal procedure itself. Back in 1875, for example, the United States
Supreme Court observed that to require proof of every fact "would be utterly
and absolutely absurd." Where a fact is known, the process of proving it is
"time-consuming and unduly formal." When a fact has been proven already,
further proof becomes "tiresome, redundant, and lacking in common sense." At
times, moreover, even an obvious fact can be difficult or time-consuming to
prove, without affecting a result that was never in doubt.
(citations omitted).
103 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT

EXAMINING PROCEDURE (8th ed. rev. 1 2003), availabk at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
pac/mpep/indexold.htm [hereinafter REVISED MPEP].
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taken, what evidence is necessary to support the examiner's
conclusion of common knowledge in the art.'04
In part A of section 2144, the Revised MPEP attempts to aid the Examiner
in determining when it is appropriate to take official notice without documentary
evidence to support the Examiner's conclusion, stating that "official notice
without documentary evidence to support an examiner's conclusion is permissible
only in some circumstances."' 0'5 The Revised MPEP, like the Unrevised MPEP,
correctly recites the language from the multitude of previous Board and court
opinions which holds that "official notice unsupported by documentary evidence
should only be taken by the examiner where the facts asserted to be well-known,
capable of instant and unquestionable
or to be common knowledge in the art0are
6
demonstration as being well-known."'
Further, the Revised MPEP cites to pertinent sections of In re Zurko stating
that "it is never appropriate to rely solely on 'common knowledge' in the art
without evidentiary support in the record, as the principal evidence upon which
a rejection was based."'0 7 Further, the Revised MPEP states that although the
"court explained that, 'as an administrative tribunal the Board clearly has expertise
in the subject matter over which it exercises jurisdiction,' it made clear that such
'expertise may provide sufficient support for conclusions [only] as to peripheral
issues.' "108 To this point, the Revised MPEP sets forth the same procedure for
taking official notice as that of the Unrevised MPEP, a procedure which allows
for the possibility of establishing a prima facie case of patentability with official
notice.'0 9 Turning to part B of section 2144 of the Revised MPEP, the drafters
begin to veer from accepted practice.
Part B of section 2144 of the Revised MPEP is entitled "If Official Notice Is
Taken of a Fact, Unsupported by Documentary Evidence, the Technical Line Of
Reasoning Underlying a Decision To Take Such Notice Must Be Clear and
Unmistakable."" 0 This part of the Revised MPEP appears to condone the use of
clear and unmistakable technical reasoning by the Examiner in place of the

104
105

Id § 2144 (emphasis added).
Id.

'06 Compare id., with UNREVISED MPEP, supranote 87, § 2144.
117 Id (citing In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386,59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1693,1697 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(" [T]he Board cannot simply reach conclusions based on its own understanding or experience-or on
its assessment of what would be basic knowledge or common sense. Rather, the Board must point
to some concrete evidence in the record in support of these findings.")).
'08 Id (citing In re Zurko, 258 F.3d at 1385-86).
'0' Compare UNREVISED MPEP, supra note 87, § 2144, with REVISED MPEP, supra note 103,
2144.
10 REVlSED MPEP, supra note 103, § 2144.
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requisite documentary evidence to prove facts and establish a prima facie case of
unpatentability. Said another way, part B of section 2144 suggests that if the
Examiner provides "specific factual findings predicated on sound technical and
scientific reasoning to support his or her conclusion of common knowledge,"
then the Examiner has succeeded in establishing a prima facie case of
unpatentability, irrespective of a seasonable challenge for documentary evidence
by the Applicant. '
Importantly, in both "older cases" cited in Part B in support of this condoned
procedure, the appellant did not seasonably challenge the taking of official notice
during prosecution. For example, in In re Chevenard, the court accepted the
Examiner taking official notice with regard to the "finding that a brief heating at
a higher temperature was the equivalent of a longer heating at a lower temperature
where there was nothing in the record to indicate the contrary and where the
applicant never demanded that the examiner produce evidence to support his
statement."" 2
Similarly, in In re SoLi the court noted that the Examiner's officially noticed fact
was unchallenged by the Applicant." 3 The court stated, in dicta, that even if the
Applicant's rebuttal that the cited references did not teach the limitation at issue
and rose to the level of a seasonable challenge pursuant to Chevenard,the court
would have nonetheless sustained the taking of official notice." 4 But this is dicta.
The holding of the case, in following Chevenard,is that the officially noticed fact
was taken as evidenced by virtue of the lack of seasonable challenge."' Further,
at the time of the In re Soli decision, the Supreme Court's seminal examination
case, Grahamv.John Deere, was not yet decided." 6 Accordingly, the explicit factual
requirements and proofs for establishing a prima facie case of unpatentability had
yet to be defined by the Court." 7
As reflected in the language of In re Soli, the United States Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (CCPA) was using the pre-Grahamdefinition of obviousness,

I Id.

In re Chevenard, 139 F.2d 711, 713, 60 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 239, 241 (C.C.P.A. 1943))
(emphasis added).
113 In re Soli, 317 F.2d 941, 946, 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 797, 800 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
112 Id. (citing

"4

Id. at 1293-94.

The court, id. at 1293 (citations omitted), remembered:
This court has long held that wherever possible, issues should be crystallized
before appeal to this court. It is neither the function of oral arguments nor briefs
before this court to question for the first time the propriety of actions of the
examiner or the board to which a response conveniently could have been made
before the Patent Office.
..
6 Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459 (1966). See sypra Part .B
(describing the Patent Office's burden of proof with respect to a prima facie case of obviousness).
..
7 See spra Part I.
115 Id.
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'
Whereas Graham, interpreting Congress's
e.g., "of no patentable significance."118
1952 Patent Act, defined the steps for determining obviousness to include, inter
alia, a comparison between the claims of the application and the pertinent prior
art and a determination as to whether a person reasonably skilled in the art would
have found the differences therebetween, if any, to be obvious. " 9
Clearly, the cases since Graham have reiterated time and again that the factual
underpinnings of a prima facie case of unpatentability must be supported by
documentary evidence (prior art). Consequently, the Revised MPEP's reliance on
these "older cases" to support the variance from the requirement for documentary evidence, allowing for an Examiner's statements of logic and sound scientific
to take the place thereof, is misguided and contrary to established case
principles
120
law.
In recent debates regarding the now infamous "business method" patents,
other older opinions have been cited in support of commentators' opinions that
would encourage more frequent use of official notice in rejecting applications for
such patents.' 21 Notably, in the 1968 CCPA case of In re Howard, the majority
held that "[i]t is our opinion that appellants' method is old and well known in the
prior art (of) which we have taken judicial notice.' 122 More particularly, in this
case the majority took judicial notice of the existence of numerous claim
limitations in upholding the Patent Office's rejection. For example, the court
stated:

"' In ra So/i, 317 F.2d at 945. The Patent Office position relating to the patentable significance
of a control was set forth by the examiner. He said:
Applicant states that Taggart has no such control like applicant's. There is no
issue taken with this view, but when one is attempting to determine the number
of bacterial cells that have come to be since a certain time lapse, how can that
determination possibly be made without a control? Such a control is standard
procedure throughout the entire field of bacteriology.
n9 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
1_0 Revised MPEP, supra note 103, § 2144.
...See John R. Thomas, The Rtsponsibihi of the Rukmaker Comparative Approaches to Patent

AdministrationReform, 17 BERKELEYTECH.L.J. 727,753 (2002) (discussing In re Boon, 439 F.2d 724,
169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 231 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Howard, 394 F.2d 869, 157 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 615
(C.C.P.A. 1968). Mr. Thomas states that:
The combination of HowardandBoon suggests not only the lenient use of official
notice in business method patent cases, but substantial staying power for
rejections founded upon official notice. Pushed to its outer limits, the court's
statement in Boon could be seen to require that a challenge to official notice must
all but disprove the noticed fact. This combination appears to provide the
USPTO with powerful tools for addressing applications claiming methods of
doing business.
122 In re Howard,394 F.2d at 871.
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It is a matter of common practice of wide notoriety, well within the
ambit of judicial cognizance, for retail outlets to list by code or
otherwise various items stocked for sale, together with the price
assigned to each item, so as to enable the clerk or sales person to
ascertain the charge to the customer.

We take judicial notice of the fact that when a sale is made of an
item, as for instance, an appliance part, it in [sic] common practice
to record the manufacturer's code number for the particular part on
the sales slip; to compare the code number with code number in the
parts catalog (memory) in order to obtain the corresponding prices
of the items; and to print or write the corresponding price of each
item sold as a sales slip for the items sold. It is our opinion that
appellants' method is old and well known in the prior art (of) which
we have taken judicial notice.123
But a careful review of the concurrence in the opinion and the opinion's
current citation history seems to support the implication that this case should be
held to its facts, and its holding as related to judicial notice kept in a vacuum.
Judge Kirkpatrick states in his concurrence:
The majority opinion reaches its conclusion solely upon judicial
notice of a "common practice of wide notoriety... for retail outlets
to list by code or otherwise various items stocked for sale, together
with the price assigned to each item, so as to enable the clerk or
sales person to ascertain the charge to the customer." I am aware
of the fact that the limits of judicial notice, particularly in patent
cases, are expanding and the field of notice is now pretty broad.
However, I think that the majority goes beyond today's l'mits in placing its
decision soley uponjudicialnotice of the above quotedpractice. Of course,
everyone knows that large department stores and supermarkets
must have some system of recording prices of the various articles
which they have for sale and keeping their sales people informed of
such prices and of changes in them made from time to time. There
may be any number of different ways of doing this, and, any number of different
systems and I do not see how, without any evidence, we can used [sic] the

"- Id at 870-71.
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doctrine ofjudidalnotice tofind that a system exists which anticipatesthat of
the application or is so nearly like it as to make the application an obvious
variation. That, it seems to me, is what we would have to do in order
to sustain the conclusion reached by the majority. Without some
concrete evidence of the priorart (ofwhich there is none) I do not think that it
is possible to find that the gystem of this application is old or that it is obvious
under Section 103. "'
Indeed, though never explicitly overruled, the CCPA and its successor court,
the Federal Circuit, have never again used judicial notice in such an overreaching
fashion. Further, the CCPA specifically differentiates judicial notice from the
official notice tool that is available to the Patent Office. In In re Pardo, the
Solicitor cited In re Howard in support of the Patent Office's rejection of the
claims as obvious in view of the Board's own logic, wherein no references were
cited. 25 The CCPA distinguished In re Howard, because that case "dealt with
taking judicial notice of'common practice of wide notoriety, well within the ambit
of judicial cognizance.'

,121

Clearly, the CCPA does not equate judicial notice with official notice and is
unwilling-rightly so-to step into the shoes of fact-finder and take judicial
notice. The CCPA holds:
In making the obviousness rejection, the board failed to follow the
three- pronged analysis required by Graham v.John Deere, whenever
the obviousness of patent claims is in issue. The board did not
determine the scope and content of the priorart or even indicate that there was
anypriorart;,it did not determine the differences between the prior
art and the claimed invention; and it did not ascertain the level of
ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.'27
Further still, in accordance with the suggested variance in part B, part C of
section 2144 of the Revised MPEP requires that the Examiner need support a
taking of official notice with adequate evidence only if the Applicant adequately
challenges the factual assertion as not properly officially notice or not properly
based on common knowledge. 2 ' Part C states that, "[tjo adequately traverse such
a finding, an applicant must specifically point out the supposed errors in the

124
125

Id at 872.
In tr Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
at 917 (citing In re Howard, 394 F.2d 869).
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
REVISED MPEP, smpra note 103, §2144 (emphasis added).

126 Id
127 Id
128
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examiner's action, which would include stating why the noticed fact is not
considered to be common knowledge or well-known in the art.'' 129 Consequently,
according to the Revised MPEP a seasonable traversal, without more, is no longer
enough to require the Examiner to provide evidentiary support for the notice fact.
Further, it is within the purview of the Examiner to determine what is or is not
an "adequate traversal." Specifically, part C states,
If applicant does not traverse the examiner's assertion of official
notice or applicant's traverse is not adequate, the examiner should
clearly indicate in the next Office action that the common knowledge or wellknown in the art statementis taken to be admittedpriorart because applicant
eitherfailed to traverse the examiner's assertion of official notice or that the
traverse was inadequate. If the traverse was inadequate, the examiner
should include an explanation as to why it was inadequate. 3 '
This procedure impermissibly allows an Examiner to shift the burden ofproof
to the Applicant without the requisite factual evidence, and begs the question:
How does an Applicant rebut a statement that a fact (a claim limitation as part of
a claim) is common knowledge without having the requisite documentary
evidence to rebut? By facilitating this process, section 2144 of the Revised MPEP
has relegated the examination process at the whim of the Examiner to a childish
game of "yes it is; no its not." Interestingly, there is no case law cited in part C
to support the requirement for an "adequate traversal" of officially noticed facts
before requiring the Examiner to provide documentary evidence.
The drafters of the Revised MPEP are misguided in relying on the "substantial
evidence" review standard resulting from Zurko and ultimately Gartsideto support
the departure from the accepted and proper official notice practice set forth in
previous versions of the MPEP. The adoption of this standard was merely a
matter of form, not substance. The evidence required to build and support the
factual record in Patent Office prosecution proceedings is documentary evidence,
which did not change with the re-naming of the review standard. Indeed, the
APA requires that a burden shifting prima facie case be supported by rebuttable
evidence. Such evidence in the case of proving unpatentability must be
documentary evidence. As stated in part E of section 2144, "[it is never
appropriate to rely solely on common knowledge in the art without evidentiary
support in
the record as the principal evidence upon which a rejection was
, 131
based."

129

Id (emphasis added).

130Id (emphasis added).
31 REVISED MPEP, supra note

103, § 2144.
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III. CONCLUSION

In the context of Patent Office proceedings, a taking of official notice with
respect to a substantive claim rejection without more is merely a subjective
statement made by the Examiner. Consequently, these statements alone do not
initially rise to the level of establishing the required prima facie case of
unpatentability such that rebuttal argument or evidence is necessary to overcome
the rejection. The relevant authority clearly does not require the Applicant for a
patent to prove patentability. Referring to the reasoning and holdings of the
numerous cases cited herein, to allow subjective statements without evidentiary
support to take the place of proof required for setting forth a prima facie case of
unpatentability would violate the APA and make a mockery of the patent system.
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